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CASENOTE 
TRUMP V. HAWAII: DISSECTING THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
PRESIDENTIAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
Paul Taske*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 2016 election cycle perhaps no other topic garnered 
more attention than the discussions around immigration. Then-
candidate Donald Trump made immigration a key aspect of his 
campaign platform.2 Almost immediately after assuming office 
President Trump attempted to fulfill his campaign promise to 
institute a “Muslim Ban” by issuing Proclamation 13769. This 
Proclamation suspended admission from seven countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa for 90 days.3  Litigation ensued almost 
immediately. A temporary restraining order was entered by the 
western district court of Washington preventing the enforcement of 
the entry restrictions.4 Ultimately, President Trump revised his order 
two more times, and each time the new order was challenged in 
court.5 Finally, this last proclamation ended up before the Supreme 
Court.6 
 This case note will examine the Court’s decision in Trump 
v. Hawaii and analyze the core of the decision in context with other 
relevant areas of constitutional law. Part II provides a detailed 
                                                 
* Associate Member, 2018-2019 Immigration and Human Rights Law Review 
2 Richard Lister, Outcry as Donald Trump calls for US Muslim Ban, BBC (Dec. 
8, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-35036567/outcry-as-
donald-trump-calls-for-us-muslim-ban. 
3 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017) (Foreign nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were barred from entering the United States for a 90-
day period.). 
4 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (2017) (per curiam).  
5 Executive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017); International Refugee 
Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. 
Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 
Fed. Reg. 45161. 
6 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). 
factual background and summary of the majority opinion. Part III 
examines the opinion in relation to other aspects of constitutional 
law, primarily foreign affairs, immigration, and justiciability. 
Finally, Part IV focuses on the alternative result proposed by the 
dissenting opinions of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor and addresses 




In July of 2018, on one of the final days of the term, the 
Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii. The Court, in a 5-4 
decision, found for the administration. To say the decision in the 
case was controversial would be an understatement. In response to 
the Court’s ruling, protests erupted across the country from New 
York City to Seattle.8 These protests conveyed a sense of injustice 
in the decision. The decision was seen as legitimizing President 
Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric against Muslims.  
The Court’s opinion deals primarily with two issues. First, 
does the president have the authority, under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), to issue proclamations which place 
temporary restrictions on the admission of foreign nationals and 
restricts their entry into the United States? Second, does the 
exclusion in this case violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment? The Court split 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the 
opinion for the Court. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor authored the 
two dissenting opinions.9 
The Court began its analysis by addressing the case’s 
procedural posture. Notably, the Court pays particular attention to 
the different iterations of the Proclamation now before them. In its 
                                                 
7 Nothing in this case note is intended as a defense of the policies upheld by the 
Court’s decision. Rather, this case note is intended to defend the outcome of the 
case given the relevant constitutional considerations discussed below. 
8 Meg Wagner, Brian Ries, and Veronica Rocha, Supreme Court Upholds Travel 
Ban, CNN (June 27, 2018, 2:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-
news/supreme-court-travel-ban/index.html. 
9 Justices Thomas and Kennedy also authored separate concurring opinions. 
first iteration the proclamation blocked immigration from Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days. These 
countries had previously been designated as posing heightened 
terrorism risks by Congress or prior administrations.10 These 
restrictions were, according to the Court, put in place to give the 
administration adequate time to make inquiries to the governments 
of these countries and collect necessary information to reduce the 
risk of terrorism.11 The second proclamation was similar to the first 
and included all countries mentioned in the first proclamation minus 
Iraq. This second proclamation also included the ability to apply for 
a waiver. Waivers were to be awarded on a case-by-case basis. The 
second proclamation selected countries designated as “a state 
sponsor of terrorism, has been compromised by terrorist activities, 
or contains active conflict zones.”12 These restrictions, like the first 
proclamation, were to be imposed for 90 days, pending completion 
of a worldwide review. 
Finally, a worldwide review was completed, and the third 
proclamation was introduced.13 Included in the final set of 
restrictions were eight countries whose information management 
and sharing systems were deemed inadequate. This version included 
a description of how foreign states were selected and included. The 
State Department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
and several intelligence agencies developed a three-pronged 
baseline test to determine whether a country’s reporting system was 
adequate. First, does the country issue electronic passports, ensure 
integrity of travel documents, report lost or stolen information, and 
provide additional identity-related information? Second, does the 
country disclose information about external risks, e.g., criminal 
history, terrorist links, etc. Finally, the agencies weighed various 
factors related to national security risks posed by a given country.14  
Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen 
                                                 
10 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2). 
11 Id. 
12 Executive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 §1(d) (2017). 
13 Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017). 
14 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 4-5). 
were identified as deficient in their risk profile and willingness or 
ability to provide adequate information.15 Under the final version, 
the Proclamation established varying restrictions to suit the risk 
presented by each country and its willingness to cooperate with the 
United States.16 The Proclamation also directed continual review of 
the listed countries to determine whether any country had 
sufficiently improved its practices. Upon one such review, Chad was 
removed from the list of designated countries and the restrictions on 
its nationals were lifted.17 
The Court kept this development and background in mind 
when considering the questions before it. Namely, whether the 
President’s actions superseded his authority, contravened the INA, 
or violated the Establishment Clause. The Court proceeded to 
address each issue in turn. 
When examining the scope of presidential authority, the 
Court looked at two sections of the INA, §1182(f) and §§1185(a)(1). 
In relevant part, §1182(f) states: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of 
any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United 
States would be detrimental to the interests of 
the United States, he may by proclamation, and for 
such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the 
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants 
or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens 
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.18 
The language of §1182(f) provides a considerable amount of 
deference to the President by its own terms. Words and phrases like 
“Whenever,” “any,” “detrimental to the interests of the United 
States,” and “for such period as he shall deem necessary” informed 
the Court’s reading and determination that Congress afforded 
immense deference to the President on matters of immigration 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 See Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 § 2 (2017). 
17 Presidential Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (2018). 
18 8 U.S.C. §1182. 
restriction and national security.19 When examined in conjunction 
with §§1185(a)(1),20 the Court found the delegation clear and 
unambiguous. It also held that the Proclamation fit within the broad 
grant provided by Congress.21  
The INA does, however, impose one limitation on the 
exercise of this broad discretion. The President must “find” that the 
entry of some aliens is detrimental to the interests of the United 
States. Based on the review the President ordered, the findings of 
the relevant agencies, the crafting of a specific limitation scheme to 
particular countries, and the report presented to Congress the Court 
observed that it was clear the President met his statutory obligation 
in this case. Further, these findings were deemed more extensive 
than any previous administration’s immigration order.22 
Additionally, the Court found the argument that the 
Proclamation at issue violated other sections of the INA to be 
without merit. Although §§1152(a)(1)(A) does prohibit nationality-
based discrimination for visa issuance it does not extend further. 
However, entry and visa issuance are separate matters. If, according 
to the Court, the President were to permit immigrants to enter the 
country he could not then use nationality as a justification to deny a 
visa application. However, he is permitted to make determinations 
about entrance based on nationality.23 
Finally, the Court turned to Appellee’s remaining argument, 
that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.24 Appellees cited multiple instances where President 
                                                 
19 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 10). 
20 The President has authority under the INA to adopt reasonable rules, 
regulations, and orders governing the entry and removal of aliens which may be 
subject to the exceptions and limitation he prescribes. 
21 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§§1182(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B), and (a)(3)(C) which permit restrictions on the 
basis of health-related grounds, criminal history, terrorist activities, and foreign 
policy grounds respectively).   
22 Id. at 11-15. 
23 Id. at 20-24. 
24 A brief discussion on standing was dealt with before turning to the 
Establishment Clause issue itself. The Court decided in favor of standing for the 
Trump spoke about the dangers of Muslims, Muslim immigration, 
and Islamic terrorism. Also raised were the President’s references to 
the Proclamation as a “Muslim Ban,” a “complete shutdown of 
Muslim Immigration,” and other instances where the President 
spoke disfavorably about Muslims.25 Yet, the Court distinguished 
between these statements and the Proclamation itself. The Court’s 
concern was solely with the Proclamation which, the Court 
observed, is “neutral on its face” with respect to religion.26 
One key aspect of the Court’s opinion on this issue is that 
unlike a typical Establishment Clause case, which deals with 
domestic policy regarding religion, this case concerns policies 
surrounding national security.27 The Court noted that questions 
concerning foreign relations, classifications made on political and 
economic circumstances, and war powers are typically best handled 
by the Executive and Legislative branches. Precedent on this front 
has been uniform and robust—especially when cases involve an 
overlap of national security interests and immigration policy.28 Such 
decisions are not unique to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In 
Free Speech jurisprudence, where the Court typically affords the 
highest level of scrutiny, the Court recognized that those rules shift 
slightly when confronted with questions of national security.29 
Even, says the Court, were the Proclamation examined in 
further detail, and weight afforded to extrinsic evidence and 
statements, it would survive a rational basis review so long as a 
justification is established which would not offend the 
                                                 
parties based on prior standing and Establishment Clause cases. See Id. at 25 
(citing Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 7); School Dist. 
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 377 U.S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963).). 
25 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 27-28). 
26 Id. at 29. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 31 (citing Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Kennedy J. concurring in 
judgment) (slip op., at 3). 
29 E.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that 
Congress may proscribe monetary contributions to designated terrorist groups 
even when those funds are designated for non-terrorist activities).  
Establishment Clause.30 In the Court’s judgment there are three key 
factors which weigh against finding an Establishment Clause 
violation based on improper animus. First, the Proclamation is 
premised on legitimate purposes—restricting entry to nationals who 
cannot be adequately vetted and pressuring such countries to reform 
their own date collection practices.31 Second, since the first iteration 
of the Proclamation was introduced, three Muslim-majority 
countries have been removed from the list of restricted countries. 
Those remaining Muslim-majority countries retain “conditional 
restrictions” until the inadequacies of their reporting systems are 
rectified.32 Third, even for those countries that remain conditionally 
restricted, the policy permits exceptions for nationals to travel to the 
United States on a variety of nonimmigrant visas.33 Finally, the 
Proclamation contains a waiver provision. This waiver provision 
covers all nationals seeking entry as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants.34 These underlying considerations, the Court 
reasoned, provide a sufficient national security justification to 
survive rational basis review.35  
The Court, via Chief Justice Roberts, treads a very fine line 
in this opinion. It neither sanctions nor condones the wisdom of the 
President’s Proclamation. As, indeed, by its own rationale it would 
be a risk to do. Yet it firmly permits the President to continue 
exercising control over national security issues as permitted in the 
INA. The balance here is important as it involves a number of 
constitutional concerns. The remainder of this note shifts to examine 
some relevant considerations the Court touches on or implies 
                                                 
30 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 32) (Noting that such 
findings are rare and have only occurred when the law itself is so clearly based 
on animus toward a protected group as to have no other possible conclusion). 
31 Id. at 34. 
32 Id. at 36. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 37 (requiring a determination to be made about whether denying entry 
causes an undue hardship, whether the entry would pose a threat to public 
safety, and if entry would be in the interest of the United States). 
35 Id. at 38. 
throughout its opinion and the potential ramifications had the Court 




The president lawfully exercised the broad discretion 
granted to him under 8 U. S. C. §1182(f) to suspend the entry of 
aliens into the United States; respondents have not demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Presidential 
Proclamation No. 9645 violates the establishment clause. 
 
III. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION 
 
When dealing in constitutional law there are often many 
competing concerns that may arise in any given case. In fact, there 
are two issues which must be satisfied before any court is deemed 
competent to hear the case: standing and justiciability. Though not 
explicitly addressed in every merit decision, these considerations 
must be kept in mind. When these requirements are not sufficiently 
met a court must properly dismiss the case. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has dismissed several cases for lack of standing36 
and justiciability.37 Other substantive areas of constitutional law 
may also shed some light on the proper disposition of this case. 
Particularly, looking at other cases concerning the First Amendment 
abroad and other recent immigration cases ought to provide 
necessary clarity and context. The Court addressed, in one form or 
another, each of these issues. This section aims to add a bit of detail 
                                                 
36 See e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (Plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue under Article III because they had not suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury and only presented a generalized grievance.). 
37 See e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (The case 
was dismissed for lack of judicial standards by which to decide the issue at 
hand—political gerrymandering.). However, it should be noted that once 
deemed non-justiciable does not mean an issue is necessarily so categorized 
permanently. The Court has found renewed interest in formerly non-justiciable 
questions recently. Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) is one such example. 
and clarity about why these issues are important and how they apply 
to President Trump’s Proclamation. 
 
A. THRESHOLD CONCERNS 
 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court explicitly addressed the 
standing concerns.38 And, while the Court mentioned justiciability 
it made only a cursory reference to it rather than detail its 
application.39 This failure to discuss justiciability thoroughly is a 
significant defect in the Court’s opinion. Though reluctance to 
expand on justiciability concerns is understandable based on the 
nature of a justiciability inquiry itself.40  
Justiciability is the doctrine which gives guidance to courts 
about what issues are appropriate for review and which are best 
suited to other branches of government. More commonly, 
justiciability is also referred to as the Political Question Doctrine 
and was formally articulated in a 1963 case, Baker v. Carr.41  
The Baker Court highlighted six categories of questions 
which, if brought before the Court, ought to be dismissed as 
nonjusticiable.  These questions are as follows: (1) Is there a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate branch of government; (2) is there is a lack of judicially 
discoverable standards to resolve the issue; (3) would a decision 
demonstrate a lack of respect to a coordinate branch of government; 
(4) would a decision require an initial policy determination outside 
the discretion of the Court; (5) would making a decision require 
                                                 
38 Trump v. Hawaii 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 24-26) (the Court found 
that the three plaintiffs before them had sufficient standing to bring the case). 
39 Id. at 8-9. 
40 Consider one fundamental difference between standing and justiciability: 
when the Court rejects a case on standing grounds it means the plaintiffs before 
them are bringing the suit improperly. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that 
still other plaintiffs might properly bring suit. In contrast, when the Court rejects 
a case on justiciability grounds it means that the Court itself is deficient in 
ability to hear the issue presented. E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall 506 (1869) 
(Congress deprived the Court of jurisdiction by legislation).  
41 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) 
would a decision leave open the door for embarrassment of one or 
more branches of government? 42 Such issues as may fall into one or 
more of these categories should, the Baker Court said, be dismissed 
as nonjusticiable political questions. 
The decision in Trump v. Hawaii falls into at least two 
categories outlined in Baker.43 There is a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” in this area to both Congress and the 
President, and there is a clear “lack of judicially discoverable 
standards” to resolve the issue involved.  
 
1. Textual Commitments 
 
The Constitution divides power among the three branches of 
government and between the federal and state governments. Broadly 
speaking, the legislature is responsible for enacting laws which 
apply to those within its jurisdiction. The executive is responsible 
for ensuring the laws passed by the legislature are enforces. And the 
judiciary is tasked with reviewing the laws and actions of the other 
branches to ensure everything complies with the Constitution. Yet, 
the operation of a government is rarely as simple as the elementary 
explanation given above. The Constitution vests each branch with 
certain powers, duties, and limitations which can—in some 
instances overlap. For instance, Congress is granted complete and 
plenary power over the area of immigration.44 The President acts as 
Commander-In-Chief of the armed forces and, as the Court has 
recognized, is the primary organ responsible for foreign affairs.45 
These aspects of legislative and executive power are not always 
                                                 
42 Id. at 210-12. 
43 It may be possible to identify additional categories occupied by this issue, but 
for purposes of clarity and brevity this note is restricted to arguably the two 
clearest limiting categories in this case. 
44 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 4. 
45 U.S. Const. Art. II § 2; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (recognizing the President as the country’s sole organ in 
the realm of foreign affairs). 
coextensive but can coincide given the proper context. In such 
circumstances Congress is permitted to delegate some of its 
authority over immigration to the President so he may fulfill his role 
in the realm of foreign affairs.46  
While finding a textual reference to a given power does not 
necessarily make an issue unreviewable by the courts, the existence 
of plenary authority outside the realm of the Court’s expertise 
generally will. In this case the Court was presented with two 
complimentary plenary powers both dealing with the policies of the 
United States to be established by a coordinate branch of 
government. To review this case as if it were any other would 
challenge the constitutional division of power among the branches.  
The Court, however, did exercise a limited examination of 
the underlying issue—the grant of authority itself. And, to that 
extend the Court found that the President did not overstep the 
authority granted by Congress’s delegation. According to the Court, 
U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) explicitly grants the president authority to make 
broad determinations regarding the admission of aliens to the United 
States by proclamation. As the Court recognized in its decision, the 
language of U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) exudes deference to the President in 
every choice of word and phrase.47 
 
2. Lack of Judicially Discoverable Standards 
 
Judicial standards are a somewhat amorphous concept often 
easier to point out where they are lacking that precisely where they 
exist. In brief, judicially discoverable standards are found, at least in 
part, by a combination of constitutional text and precedent. For 
instance, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
contains judicially manageable standards. The Equal Protection 
Clause “are well developed and familiar, . . . if on the particular facts 
they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply 
arbitrary and capricious action.”48 
                                                 
46 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
47 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 10).  
48 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis in original). 
Yet, when dealing with issues of foreign affairs and 
immigration the standards are not so clearly developed. While the 
Equal Protection Clause requires what has come to be known as 
strict scrutiny, foreign affairs receive the most extreme form of 
deference possible—perhaps not even rising to the level of a rational 
basis standard. The Court has deferred to the executive’s judgement 
on these matters in times of war and conflict, and generally when 
matters arise concerning national security.49 This standard of 
deference arises not because the Court has nothing to say about a 
given policy but because it has no firm grounding in which to base 
whatever may be said about a given policy whether positive or 
negative.50  
If no judicially manageable standards are present the Court 
should dismiss the case as improvidently granted or refuse to grant 
certiorari at all. These concerns, textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment and judicially discoverable standards are 
crucial bedrock questions which must be sufficiently addressed 
before any merits of the case are reached no matter how juicy the 
policy question may be. Nonetheless, even if the plaintiffs in Trump 
v. Hawaii did sufficiently demonstrate that the case was justiciable, 
there are still substantive issues of constitutional law to address.51  
                                                 
49 E.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 5829 (1988) (President Regan) 
(suspending the entry of certain Panamanian nationals “until such time as . . . 
democracy has been restored in Panama”); Presidential Proclamation No. 6958 
(1996) (President Clinton) (suspending entry for members of the Sudanese 
government and armed forces); Presidential Proclamation No. 8693 (2011) 
(President Obama) (suspending the entry of individuals subject to a travel 
restriction under United Nation Security Council resolutions); Trump v. Hawaii, 
585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 14) (noting that there have been 43 suspension 
orders issued since the enactment of the INA). 
50 Plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii attempt to provide judicially manageable 
standards by raising an Establishment Clause concern. This will be addressed in 
Part IV. 
51 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9) (The Court “assumes 
without deciding” that Plaintiff’s statutory claims are reviewable and do not 
violate the Political Question Doctrine.). Presumably, this assumption carries on 
to the Establishment Clause claim as well though justiciability is not mentioned 
in that section of the opinion.  
 
B. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTIUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
  
 The Constitution, according to Chief Justice Marshall, was 
designed to provide the great outlines and important objectives 
explicitly designated. The rest—i.e., the interplay between these 
major objectives and any minor objectives—must be deduced from 
the outlines provided.52 However, it would be naïve to base our 
analysis on isolated clauses or even single Articles. As Justice 
Jackson recognized, the Constitution intends both for a division of 
power and for those powers to be integrated into a workable 
government.53 In this case, it is helpful to examine the interplay on 
issues of foreign affairs, immigration, and the First Amendment.  
 
1. Foreign Affairs 
 
As noted above, the Constitution grants Congress plenary 
power over immigration.54 It also grants the President sole authority 
in the field of foreign affairs.55 These separate grants of power have 
not been understood as conflicting. Rather, in situations of 
overlapping authority cooperation is required between the two 
branches. Delegation has been one method of cooperation employed 
by Congress to achieve its goal of comprehensive and uniform 
immigration policy.56 
Yet, cooperation and agreement are not always possible, and 
when cooperation is possible a given action may still be challenged 
by the states or the People. In such situations the Court relies on a 
test developed by Justice Jackson to determine the permissible scope 
                                                 
52 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 200 (1819). 
53 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson J. 
concurring).  
54 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 4. 
55 U.S. Const. Art. II § 2. 
56 E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) 
(Congress can defer to the judgment of the President when dealing with foreign 
affairs and foreign nationals). 
of presidential authority. Justice Jackson’s framework divides the 
scope of presidential authority into three categories denoting the 
zenith, twilight, and ebb of presidential power. 
 First, if the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization by Congress, the President’s power is said to be at its 
zenith or highest point. In such cases the President is able to act 
using the Article II powers plus whatever authority Congress has 
opted to delegate. Second, if the President acts without grant nor 
denial of congressional delegation, the President’s power is said to 
be in a “Twilight Zone” because there may be concurrent powers 
held by both the President and Congress without a clear definition 
of which shall be responsible for such action. In such circumstances 
the President may take action not explicitly granted by Article II, 
but which are believed necessary to further the duties of the office. 
Finally, if the President acts in opposition to the express or implied 
will of Congress, the President’s power is deemed to be at its 
weakest ebb. In such circumstances the President must rely solely 
on the powers explicitly vested by Article II.57 When the President 
is acting at the lowest ebb of constitutional authority, courts may 
review these actions and sustain the action only by restraining 
Congress from acting concurrently—to avoid contradictory 
mandates from the two branches. However, because such reviews 
are, in practice, conclusive and preclusive they must be undertaken 
with the utmost caution.58  
In the present circumstances, President Trump’s 
proclamation almost certainly falls squarely within the first of 
Justice Jackson’s three categories. Congress’s intent was made 
manifest in 1972 when the Immigration and Nationality Act was 
passed. The Act makes clear, in at least two separate provisions, that 
Congress intended to vest the President with the power to determine 
which foreign nationals are permitted into the country, for what 
reason foreign nationals may be denied entry, and to adopt 
                                                 
57 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson J. 
concurring).  
58 Id. 
“reasonable rules” governing the admission and removal of aliens.59 
In fact, the Court determined that the language of §1182(f) exudes 
deference to the President at every opportunity.60  
A broad grant of authority, however, would not give the 
President authority to override sections of the INA which Congress 
has expressly outlined the proper policy of the United States. When 
a potential conflict is raised it is explicitly the province of the 
judiciary to review and resolve the potential conflict.61 Plaintiffs 
raised just such an argument before the Court. Plaintiffs alleged that 
the Proclamation issued under the authority of §1182 and 1185(a)(1) 
conflicted with §1152(a)(1)(A).62 
The Court, however, disagreed with Plaintiffs’ contention 
and highlighted the distinction between admissibility 
determinations—under which the Proclamation was made—and 
visa issuance which is a narrower subset of immigration policy. This 
reading still holds in tact the prohibition against nationality-based 
discrimination but refuses to expand the prohibition to the whole of 
the immigration system. Such a broadening of the prohibition would 
unduly hamper the President’s ability to make determinations 
related to national security concerns.63  
It is likely, however, even had the Court determined this 
statutory issue to involve a conflict, the Court would have deemed 
the Proclamation to balance these requirements appropriately based 
on the case-by-case waiver provisions present in the Proclamation 
itself. This, coupled with the Proclamation’s prima facie language 
about national security and the broad grant of authority in §1182(f), 
would have provided all necessary bases to uphold the Proclamation 
on statutory grounds. 
                                                 
59 U.S.C. 8 §1182, 1185(a)(1). 
60 U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) (deferential language includes such phrases as “Whenever 
the President,” “any aliens or class of aliens,” “detrimental to the interests of the 
United States,” etc.) (emphasis added). 
61 Marbury v. Madison, 5 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
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an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, 
or place of residence.” 
63 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op. at 21). 
2. Immigration 
 
The realms of immigration and foreign affairs often coincide 
with one another. Accordingly, it can be difficult to fully separate 
the two but can also be helpful when confronted by issues with 
several moving components. President Trump’s Proclamation is one 
such instance. Although the proclamation certainly is concerned 
with “foreign affairs” it is also directly related to “immigration” by 
the admission and denial of persons into the United States. 
The Court’s prior policy on matters of immigration has been 
one of deference to the decisions made by the Executive and 
Legislative branches.64 However, this policy is not necessarily 
absolute or intended as a firewall for legitimate claims. For instance, 
when other justiciable constitutional issues are present the Court 
may properly resolve the dispute.65 In other words, immigration is 
not an immediate bar to jurisdiction, but the Court will be cautious 
when dealing in these areas to avoid overstepping its bounds and 
violating Separation of Powers principles. 
 In fact, the Court recognizes that the scope of its inquiry into 
matters of immigration which intersect with foreign affairs is 
necessarily circumscribed.66 Further inquiry into the issue, even at 
the government’s behest, would only serve to confuse the issue 
because the question of jurisdiction is non-waivable.67  Therefore, 
rather than examine the contours of immigration policy in this case, 
the Court pivots to the First Amendment question. The Court notes, 
however, even when examining the Proclamation from a different 
perspective—i.e., the Establishment Clause—the policy will still be 
upheld so long as it meets rational basis because of the caution the 
Court adopts when matters of national security are facially involved. 
                                                 
64 Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1967).  
65 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federalism concerns drove 
the Court’s decision to strike down Arizona’s law mirroring federal immigration 
policy because Congress has plenary authority over immigration which cannot 
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66 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 32). 
67 Id. 
3. The First Amendment 
 
As in the other sections of this discussion, the First 
Amendment is tied, in this case, with issues of foreign affairs and 
immigration. The difficulty, however, is applying existing First 
Amendment precedent to the situation at hand. Most of the First 
Amendment jurisprudence, particularly regarding the Establishment 
Clause concerns purely domestic affairs.  
There are rare exceptions, however. The Court references the 
most recent of these hybrid cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, at various point throughout its opinion.68 In Holder, the 
Court was confronted with an issue of national security which 
intersected with traditionally protected First Amendment rights, 
namely free speech. Certain American citizens wished to donate 
funds to various international groups for humanitarian purposes; 
however, these groups had been designated as terrorist organizations 
by the Secretary of State.69  
Despite the general and robust protection of the First 
Amendment’s Speech Clause domestically, even the protection of 
using money as speech,70 the court upheld the restriction on 
donations to designated terrorist organizations. The Court stated that 
when First Amendment issues are concerned it will not blindly defer 
to the government’s reading of the First Amendment but will 
consider such national security issues as the government raises 
recognizing its own deficiencies in that area. Recognizing both its 
role in protecting individual rights and its limitations in foreign 
affairs, the Court narrowly addressed the question and held that the 
material support statute in Holder did not violate the First 
Amendment.  
Similarly, the Court in Trump v. Hawaii also took pains to 
recognize its deficiencies in the matter before them but did not 
abdicate its judicial role. The Court, looking at what it took to be the 
whole of relevant evidence, determined, both prima facie and in 
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69 Holder, 561 U.S. at 35. 
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application, that the Proclamation did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. The Court pointed to various considerations but paid 
particular attention to the text of the Proclamation. The 
Proclamation itself dealt with territory for the stated purpose of 
prompting other countries to improve reporting practices with 
various United States agencies. The Court also noted that the travel 
restrictions have not been permanent and that once reporting has 
improved countries are removed from the list of restricted nations.71 
 
IV. ALTERNATE POSSIBILITES 
  
The majority and dissent broadly agree on the case’s 
underlying factual basis.72 While both dissenting opinions, the first 
by Justice Breyer and the second by Justice Sotomayor, would find 
the proclamation unconstitutional they arrive at that conclusion by 
separate rationales.  
Justices Breyer’s dissent is almost exclusively policy-driven. 
Justice Breyer places heavy emphasis on the application of the 
Proclamation’s various waivers and exceptions. He holds that these 
exceptions to the blanket ban are largely being ignored and amount 
to little more than window-dressing in an attempt to legitimize 
naked religious discrimination.73 This discrimination, taken together 
with President Trump’s external statements, suggests that the 
injunction should remain in place until the issues has been fully 
litigated below.74  
Justice Sotomayor dissent, on the other hand, focuses on 
prior Free Exercise jurisprudence to highlight the issue presented by 
                                                 
71 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11, 35). 
72 Although the dissent places more emphasis on the importance on the 
President’s external statements about Muslims and Islam. The dissent would 
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the President’s Proclamation—the favoring or disfavoring of one 
religion (Islam) over another.75 A reasonable observer, Sotomayor 
asserts, would, based on the openly available data, historical context 
of the proclamation, and the specific sequence of events leading to 
it, conclude that the Proclamation was primarily intended to disfavor 
Islam by excluding its adherents from the country.76  
  
IV-A. BREYER’S DISSENT 
 
Justice Breyer points to several instances where the statistics 
surrounding the application of the Proclamation are disheartening. 
These statistics tend to show that the waiver and exception clauses 
contained within the Proclamation are not being utilized as robustly 
as they might otherwise be. That these provisions are underutilized, 
Breyer asserts, is evidence of invidious discrimination.77 Yet, 
Breyer’s premise runs contrary to other decisions made by this 
Court. The Court, when examining a policy for potential 
constitutional issues, looks to the purpose of the policy itself—
largely by examining a statute’s text. Statistical information and 
other external evidence are not sufficient to establish 
unconstitutional state action.78 Rather, the policy itself must contain 
the offending or discriminating language.79  
This same standard is applied even when religious issues are 
at play. If a law is not neutral and generally applicable—leaving 
aside the potential issue of applicability to international issues—
then the law must be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
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78 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (The mere fact of disparate 
impact to one group is not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.). 
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and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.80 Only if a statute 
is not facially neutral while also being generally applicable or is not 
justified by compelling interests achieved through a narrowly 
tailored law will a statute be invalidated under the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.81 Similarly, in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence the neutrality principle is employed when 
evaluating governmental actions or policies.82  
The Proclamation, and its history, contains several key 
features which should assuage some trepidation surrounding the 
controversial policy. First, the Proclamation applies to countries and 
not specific religious sects within countries. Second, the exceptions 
to the broad restrictions prescribed by the proclamation are 
individual in nature and also fail to target religious sects for favored 
or disfavored treatment.83 Finally, over the course of the 
Proclamation’s development, and current implementation, three 
Muslim-majority countries were removed from the list of restricted 
countries.84  
Although Justice Breyer raises interesting points of concern 
about the Proclamation, his method of reasoning is not consistent 
with the standards generally persuasive to the Court on issues of 
constitutional law. And, as Justice Breyer mentions at the close of 
his opinion, despite the Court’s striking down of the national 
injunction issued by the district court, the district court is still free 
to examine this issue further. Now the district court must simply do 
so without an injunction in place while it deliberates.85 
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IV-B. SOTOMAYOR’S DISSENT 
 
Unlike Justice Breyer, in her dissent, Justice Sotomayor is 
primarily concerned with the First Amendment issues posed by 
President Trump’s Proclamation. In short, Sotomayor believes that 
President Trump’s statements and tweets about his Proclamation, 
“travel-ban,” or “Muslim-ban” present enough evidence to show 
that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause 
claim because they depart so starkly from the Establishment 
Clause’s guarantee of neutrality. Therefore, she would affirm the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision and uphold the injunction.86  
Justice Sotomayor references a plethora of First Amendment 
precedent to justify her stance on this issue. The case law she cites 
highlights the importance of neutrality toward religion and refusing 
to favor or disfavor one religion or another.87 She combines this 
principle with the argument that Congress has already enacted a 
fully sufficient system of immigration control. This system, 
therefore, renders the Proclamation unnecessary, repetitive, and to 
the extent that it deviates from Congress’s established system, 
harmful.88 This argument is bolstered by amici who contend that the 
policy set forth in the Proclamation is harmful to the interests of the 
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19) (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012). 
United States and extensive detailing of various provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.89 
Yet, Justice Sotomayor’s argument is susceptible to at least 
three primary criticisms. First, despite her plethora of citations, the 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence she cites deals almost entirely 
with domestic application of the First Amendment. She does not 
address the implications cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project and the impact such internationally focused applications of 
the First Amendment would have on her theory.90 Second, her use 
of Arizona v. United States is misplaced. Arizona focused on the 
dispersion of immigration authority between Congress and the 
individual states rather than the interplay of co-equal branches of 
government.91 And, finally, Justice Sotomayor’s reliance on the 
opinions of various amici such as the “Former National Security 
Officials” highlights that these decisions are one of policy best left 
to other political branches to resolve. As such, these political 
decisions weigh against the Court having jurisdiction over the issue 
at all.92 
One final piece worth mentioning in Sotomayor’s dissent 
comes from a footnote. Sotomayor challenges the notion that the 
Court should defer to the Executive Branch on this issue. This 
challenge is supported by the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
which explicitly says that although the Constitution envisions a 
strong role for the executive in the context of foreign affairs, “it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches of government when 
individual liberties are at stake.”93 Although this point may be 
enough to overcome issues concerning justiciability and political 
questions it would not extend so far as to govern the outcome of this 
                                                 
89 Id. at 18-21. 
90 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (First Amendment rights may be curtailed if the 
government provides a compelling justification and the restriction is narrowly 
tailored. Such permissible justifications include national security and preventing 
terrorism.). 
91 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
92 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
93 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (slip op., at 
15-16 fn. 6) 
or any given case where “a role for all three branches” exists when 
handling issues of national security.  
 
IV-C. WHAT IF? 
 
When examining hot-button issues, it can often be helpful to 
hypothesize about what the alternative outcome might have looked 
like to better understand the strengths or weaknesses of the actual 
outcome and of the dissenting or opposing view.  
What might the alternative outcome have looked like in this 
case? In the concrete the answer is simple. The injunction would 
have been upheld and the Proclamation would have been deemed 
unconstitutional. The implications for that decision, however, would 
have been somewhat more complicated. Had the majority lost and 
the dissenting justices prevailed, the Supreme Court would have 
intervened in the area of foreign affairs and immigration. What’s 
more, it would have done so when Congress delegated its authority, 
in relevant part, to the executive and granted the Executive broad 
discretion. The Supreme Court would, in effect, have final authority 
over matters of immigration and foreign affairs where previously 
they had almost none. 
Perhaps the most effective illustration of the impact of this 
hypothetical situation would be best accomplished through analogy. 
Luckily, it is not necessary to invent a hypothetical scenario. The 
Supreme Court has already provided an apt example for 
comparison.94 In McCreary the State of Kentucky made several 
arguments before the Court regarding displays in the state 
courthouse. The first appearance dealt with a display of the Ten 
Commandments. The Court found this violated the establishment 
clause and showed evidence of state preference for the Jewish and 
Christian religions.95 Kentucky fared no better in its second or third 
appearance before the Court. Each time Kentucky endeavored to 
comply with the Court’s mandate proscribing religious preference. 
                                                 
94 McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 
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First Kentucky elected to include the Commandments among other 
religious passages to dispel the impression of state-preference to 
religion.96 The second alteration still included the Ten 
Commandments but as a portion of a larger presentation focusing on 
the foundations of American law.97 The Court considered these 
alterations in light of Kentucky’s past displays and ultimately found 
each to still be unduly preferential toward religion and altogether 
lacking in a secular purpose.98  
It is not difficult to notice the similarities between the 
Court’s approach in McCreary and the analysis engaged in by the 
dissenting justices in this case. As such, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that a similar standard would have applied had the result 
been in the dissenting justices’ favor. And, while domestic issues—
such as religious displays in a state courthouse—permit for long and 
drawn-out proceedings before the Court, issues dealing with 
national security do no always permit such lengthy periods of 
uncertainty. Yet, had the Court assumed a similar role here as it did 
in McCreary, uncertainty would surely have been introduced into 
foreign affairs. The President, current and future, would be subject 
to approval by the Court before he or she could confidently expect 
an order or policy to be put into effect. Such important spheres do 
not, of course, render a President immune from all potential action—
nor should they. Yet, it is important to recognize the inadequacy of 
courts to deal with these issues and thus why they often defer to the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
As this case demonstrates, several constitutional 
considerations might easily be presented by a single case. These 
issues are often difficult to resolve either for legal or other reasons. 
Yet, it is precisely the role of the courts to determine what the result 
of a given case ought to be and whether it has authority to resolve a 
given issue. It is also the responsibility of the Supreme Court to look 
forward and judge how a given opinion might impact future cases 
and other areas of law.100 In this case, the Court opted to exercise 
caution. The Court chose to avoid future legal quadrangles and rely 
on a tested constitutional principle: Separation of Powers. 
Although the Court refrained from striking down the 
Proclamation, neither this decision nor the Separation of Powers 
doctrine leaves the President immune in this area. Rather, the Court 
simply acknowledged the inherently political nature of these issues 
and left it to the political branches of government to resolve. 
Congress delegated some of its immigration authority to the 
President. It is Congress, therefore, that must assess and, if 
necessary, revise that delegation of power. The only question that 
remains is whether Congress will choose to reclaim its authority or 
whether Congress will permit the current distribution of power to 
persist. In either case, it is Congress that must take up the mantle of 
responsibility on this issue. 
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